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INTRODUCTION
When forming a subjective judgment of the likelihood of an adverse outcome, it is essential to take account of the influence of each factor that might increase the likelihood of that outcome. For example, an individual who wishes to estimate how likely it is that he/she will develop heart disease could simply make a judgment based on whether or not he/she smokes. However, to arrive at a more accurate estimate, the individual should also consider his/her exposure to other risk factors for heart disease (e.g., poor diet, sedentary lifestyle, high alcohol consumption, etc.). Likewise, someone who is assessing the probability of a specific type of accident in their workplace should evaluate the potential influence of all risk factors (e.g., human error, equipment failure, etc.), rather than just one potential antecedent.
Hence, when attempting to form accurate risk judgments, it is often important to consider how several risk factors might influence the likelihood of the adverse event; particularly, when the goal is to form subjective risk judgments that can reliably inform decisions regarding when best to take proportionate adaptive or precautionary actions. (1) Forming a single subjective risk judgment that takes into account the influence of multiple risk factors is a complex task. For example, there is the challenge of making a reasonably accurate assessment of the risk attributable to each separate risk factor and, subsequently, assimilating these separate judgments to determine how the presence of each factor and/or each combination of factors might affect the overall risk. (2) Handling such complexities could prove to be cognitively demanding, particularly when time, mental resources, and/or relevant information are limited. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that individuals may use simplifying cognitive strategies to help them to make these important subjective risk judgments. For instance, it is possible that individuals may utilize the number of risk factors in a given situation as a cue for inferring the overall likelihood of a specific adverse event.
In this paper, we present three studies that specifically aimed to assess how variations in the number of risk factors in a given context can influence risk judgments. Taken together, the three studies provide empirical evidence that shows (a) how individuals use the number of risk factors as a cue when judging the overall likelihood of an adverse outcome (b) the way in which individuals process information about the number of risk factors can lead to significant differences in their judgments of the overall risk and (c) 'perceived vulnerability to the number of risk factors' can have an important influence on risk judgments.
The Potential Effects of Risk Factor Quantity on Risk Judgments
Despite the powerful influence that the number of risk factors can have on the likelihood of adverse events and could have on related subjective risk judgments, there is a dearth of research that has specifically examined the extent to which individuals rely on the number of risk factors as an independent cue for inferring outcome likelihood. However, the closely related literature points towards two possible ways in which variations in the number of risk factors in a given situation might influence risk judgments. First, Support Theory and research on the 'numerosity heuristic' indicate that individuals might use the number of risk factors as a cue when forming risk judgments, with a greater number of risk factors being used to infer a greater probability. (3) (4) (5) (6) Specifically, Support Theory suggests that probability judgments tend to increase when more details of a potential event are provided (e.g., higher probability judgments are provided for the chance of a terrorist attack occurring in Belgium, Germany, Holland and France, etc. than for the chance of a terrorist attack occurring anywhere in Europe). Support Theory argues that the provision of more details focuses the individual's attention on specific evidence and possibilities, and that this process of mentally 'unpacking' the description leads to the development of more vivid and salient mental representations of the event. Consequently, the individual believes that the event is more plausible and they increase their subjective probability judgment. (7; also see 8) Hence, in contexts where the number of risk factors might vary, Support Theory indicates that the provision of more details about factors that can increase the probability of a particular adverse outcome could lead to increases in subjective risk estimates. Similarly, research shows that people often rely on a 'numerosity heuristic' when making risk judgments. (3, 4, 9) That is, individuals infer that the probability of a specific adverse event increases when there is a relative increase in the quantity of distinct elements of a particular 'risky' stimulus. For example, Pelham et al.
(1994) developed a task in which participants had to choose between one of two routes across a minefield. (4) The first route featured five mines that each had a 0.2 probability of detonation and the second route featured ten mines that each had a 0.1 probability of detonation. The study revealed that, whilst the probability of avoiding a detonation was lower for the second route (0.9 10 > 0. 
The Present Research
The Incremental Increase Model is underpinned by a logical inference that as the number of risk factors increases the associated risk increases in an incremental fashion. The Pronounced Increase Model is not inconsistent with such logic. However, it does suggest the existence of a simplifying psychological mechanism that might serve to help individuals to identify when there may be a much greater/lesser need to consider instigating precautionary or preventive behaviors. Indeed, the existence of such a mechanism could provide a partial explanation as to why individuals sometimes have attenuated or heightened risk perceptions in certain circumstances. (14) We hypothesized that individuals may be more likely to make judgments that are consistent with the Pronounced Increase Model when they are required to form a single, 
STUDY 1
In this study we used a simplified scenario to assess whether individuals' risk judgments increased in a pronounced manner when the number of risk factors in the scenario varied (as a between-subjects factor) between zero, one, two or three factors.
Method

Participants
We recruited 126 undergraduate management students (60 women, 66 men) by verbal invitation during a lecture at a large UK university and gave them the opportunity to be entered into a prize draw to win one of three prizes worth £10, £25 or £100, respectively. The mean age of the participants was 19.1 years (SD = 1.72).
Procedure
Via an online survey, we presented each participant with a single written description of the same scenario: a group of one hundred running club members meeting for their weekly run in the local city park. In the scenario, the number of risk factors (zero, one, two or three) that could cause the runners to suffer an injury was varied as a between-subjects' factor.
Participants were asked to provide a risk judgment, in a relative frequency format, regarding the number of running club members who would suffer an injury during the run. We opted to use a scenario about the risk of suffering an injury whilst exercising, as we felt that all participants would have some experience and/or vicarious knowledge of such an event. had been asked to imagine a scenario that featured a minimal, background risk of injury to the 100 runners (hereafter described as the 'zero risk factor' condition).
Those participants who were not assigned to the zero risk factor condition then read that the runners were exposed to either one, two or three additional factors that could increase the risk of an injury during the run. The risk factors that were described were either: the runners ran "the first two miles along a different route on concrete pathways that go up and down steep hills" ('steep hills' factor); the runners ran "the second two miles across an uneven pathway" ('uneven pathway' factor); and the runners ran "an additional two miles (six miles in total) along the usual concrete pathways" ('extra miles' factor). Participants were randomly allocated to either the zero (n = 32), one, (n = 33), two (n = 31) or three (n = 30) risk factor conditions.
In the one and two risk factor conditions, the risk factors featured in the scenario were randomly selected from the pool of three factors to negate the possibility that the mean risk estimates would be biased by specific single or combined factors. Furthermore, each of the three risk factors were described as operating at different stages in the run (first two miles, second two miles, and two extra miles) and, therefore, could not affect the runners simultaneously. This was done to ensure that this study would test the influence of the total number of risk factors on the participants' risk judgments, rather than the influence of any perceived interactions between specific combinations of simultaneously occurring risk factors.
In the three factor condition, all three factors were included. We considered the possibility that the participants might perceive one of the three individual risk factors (i.e., steep hills, uneven pathway, or extra miles) to be significantly more/less 'risky' that the other risk factors. If such a risk factor were depicted (cf. not depicted) in the 'one' or 'two' risk factor scenarios it could have led to disproportionate increases/decreases in the participants' risk judgments, and this would negate our ability to assess the extent to which the quantity, rather than type, of risk factor was affecting the risk judgments. To minimize this possibility, we conducted a pilot study in which we asked participants (N = 27) to provide risk judgments for the scenario depicting only one of the three single risk factors. We found no significant difference between the risk judgments (M = 9.85, SD = 8.18) for all three individual risk factors (steep hills, uneven paths, two extra miles:
Results
As shown in Figure 1 , the participants' mean risk judgments for the zero (M = 11.16, SD = 13.92), one (M = 11.00, SD = 12.92) and two (M = 10.39, SD = 10.35) risk factor conditions were approximately equal. However, the participants' mean risk judgments for the three risk factor condition (M = 23.77, SD = 24.45) were more than twice that observed in each of the other conditions. We analyzed the judgment data using a one-way ANOVA and employed a planned contrast to test whether there was a significant difference between the risk judgments of participants in the three risk factor condition and risk judgments in the other conditions. [Insert Figure 1 about here]
Discussion
The lack of variation between the risk judgments provided by the participants in the zero, one, and two risk factor conditions suggested that, in contrast to the Incremental Increase Model, individual's risk judgments for situations that feature a variable number of risk factors do not necessarily increase as a function of the number of risk factors. However, consistent with the Pronounced Increase Model, we found that participants' risk judgments in the three risk factor condition were markedly higher than in all the other conditions. Hence, the results from Study 1 suggest that our participants formed globalized impressions of risk in which zero, one or two risk factor scenarios were perceived to represent a situation characterized by relatively equal and low levels of risk, whereas the three risk factor scenario was perceived to represent a situation characterized by a distinctively higher level of risk.
This finding is important as it highlights that (a) it cannot be assumed that individuals increase their risk judgments in response to an awareness of more risk factors and (b) a reliance on globalized judgments of risk could lead individuals to negate some of the additional risk associated with certain factors (e.g., negating the potential difference between being exposed to zero and two risk factors). 
STUDY 2
In this study, the same scenario was employed as in Study 1. However, on this occasion, the number of risk factors was varied as a within-subjects factor. This meant that each participant reviewed four scenarios in turn; each involving one of the four possible quantities of risk factors (i.e., zero, one, two, three). After reviewing each scenario they were asked to provide a risk judgment related to that scenario. This enabled us to assess the extent to which participants revised their judgments upwards or downwards based on explicit variations in the number of risk factors. Hence, in contrast to the risk judgments that were observed in Study 1, we expected to see, in line with the Incremental Increase Model, a positive correlation between the number of risk factors and subjective risk judgments.
Method
Participants
We recruited a separate sample of 83 undergraduate management students (48 women, 35 men) by verbal invitation during a research methods lecture at a different UK university.
Students were asked to participate in order to improve their knowledge of empirical research.
The mean age of the participants was 20.7 years (SD = 4.09).
Procedure
Via an online survey, each participant examined in turn four written scenarios that each described, identical to Study 1, a group of running club members meeting for their weekly run in the local city park. The number of risk factors depicted in each of the four scenarios was varied as a within-subjects' factor so that each participant reviewed a zero, one, two and three risk factor scenario. The risk factors that appeared in each scenario were randomly selected from the same pool of three risk factors used in Study 1: 'steep hills', 'uneven pathway', and the 'extra miles'. Having read a given scenario, participants were asked to provide a risk judgment, in a relative frequency format, regarding the number of running club members who would suffer an injury during the run. As a between-subjects factor, the presentation order of the four scenarios was varied in one of three ways: (i) randomly (ii) incrementally increasing the number of risk factors from zero to three and (iii)
incrementally decreasing the number of risk factors from three to zero. The presentation order was not varied in order to test a specific hypothesis, but simply to negate the possibility that the order might have influenced the participants' risk judgments.
Results
As shown in Figure 2 , the participant's mean risk judgments increased incrementally [Insert Figure 2 about here]
Discussion
Consistent with the Incremental Increase Model, the participants in Study 2 revised their risk judgments upwards (downwards) in relatively even increments as the number of risk factors increased (decreased). This finding suggested that the participants had probably engaged in cognitive assessments that involved deliberatively assessing (a) the extent to which the addition (subtraction) of risk factors would affect the overall risk and (b) the coherence of each risk judgment relative to their prior risk judgments. By contrast, the participants in Study 1 had only needed to make a single risk judgment without cognitively assessing whether this judgment was logically consistent with any previous judgments.
Without having a prior risk judgment(s) to act as an 'anchor', it appears that the participants in Study 1 had relied more on the number of risk factors as a cue to formulating a global impression of the overall risk and had arrived at more categorically distinct assessments.
STUDY 3
We recognized that Studies 1 and 2 did not provide a clear explanation as to why the risk judgments produced by the participants in Study 1 increased markedly when the number of risk factors increased from two to three. Clearly, it is important to understand why individuals may perceive the overall risk in a situation as markedly 'higher'/'lower' as such insights could help to better understand why and when individuals might be more likely to could be a function of both the number of risk factors and the perceived vulnerability of potential victims to those factors, we conducted a third study.
For this study we developed a more complex scenario. The scenario enabled us to effectively manipulate vulnerability so that we could assess our prediction that risk judgments would only increase in a pronounced manner when (a) the number of risk factors was low and vulnerability to the risk factors was relatively high and (b) the number of risk factors was high and vulnerability to those risk factors was relatively low.
Method
Participants
We used Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk to recruit a sample of 378 US participants and paid them $1 each. (21, 22) To identify inattentive participants, we employed an 'instructional manipulation check' (IMC). (23) Participants that failed the IMC were excluded from the analysis, leaving a final sample of 346 participants (146 women, 200 men). This failure-rate was lower than observed in previous tests of IMCs. (23) The mean age was 33.14 (SD = 11.64).
Procedure
Each participant reviewed a single written scenario that asked them to imagine a group of 100 different men who had no history of serious health problems. As a betweensubjects factor, the 100 men were described as being either 25 years old or 65 years old (vulnerability factor). 1 In the scenario, the number of 'heart attack' risk factors (zero, one, two, three or four: number of risk factors) that the men had been exposed to throughout their adult life was also varied as a between-subjects factor. Participants were asked to provide, in a relative frequency format, a risk judgment regarding the number of men aged 25 (65) who would suffer a heart attack before reaching the age of 40 (80). Participants were randomly allocated to either the 25/65 years old condition (n = 166/180) and then further randomly allocated to either the zero (n = 33/37), one, (n = 36/36), two (n = 33/32), three (n = 35/36) or four (n = 29/39) risk factor conditions. ('sedentary' factor). In the one, two and three risk factors scenarios, the text also stated to which of the four risk factors the men had not been exposed. The risk factors featured in the one, two and three risk factor scenarios were randomly selected from the pool of four factors.
In the four factor condition, all four factors from the pool were included. Having read about the risk factors, participants then read "Assuming that they do not change any of these lifestyle habits, how many of these 100 men do you think will suffer a heart attack before they are
(80) years old?"
The use of this scenario enabled us to address two limitations of the scenario employed in Studies 1 and 2. First, the '100 runners' scenario represented a simplified situation (e.g., the runners were exposed to each of the individual risk factors sequentially rather than simultaneously and each risk factor did not present risks that accumulated over long time periods). Consequently, it was not clear whether the pronounced increase in risk judgments that were observed in Study 1 would be evident in circumstances that more closely mimicked the complex circumstances encountered in daily life (e.g., simultaneous exposure to risk factors; exposure to factors that present cumulative risks). Second, although the participant's risk judgments in Study 1 did not vary between the zero, one and two risk factor conditions, we believed that it would be highly unlikely that this lack of variation in subjective risk judgments would be evident in all situations; as highlighted above, research evidence shows that subjective risk judgments can increase/decrease depending on the presence/absence of certain risk factors (e.g., subjective judgments concerning the risk of developing lung cancer for smokers [one factor] are typically higher than subjective judgments for non-smokers [zero factor]). This evidence led us to believe that the 'punctuated equilibrium' (i.e., a plateau in data points followed by a sudden increase) observed in Study 1 may not necessarily be as pronounced in all contexts. In other words, the '100 runners scenario' did not enable us to determine the extent to which the number of risk factors might still affect risk judgments in circumstances where each risk factor would be likely to increase subjective risk judgments beyond the level subjectively attributed to a 'zero risk factor' scenario. The new scenario was also developed to address this issue.
Based on our findings in Study 1, we predicted that a pronounced/significant increase in risk judgments would be evident in both the '25' and '65' year olds' conditions. However, consistent with the greater vulnerability of older people to cardiovascular incidents, we anticipated that the pronounced increase in risk judgments would be evident for a lower number of risk factors in the '65 (cf. 25) year olds' condition. Furthermore, consistent with the evidence highlighted above (e.g., 17, 18) , we also anticipated that our participants would perceive the risk of each individual risk factor to be greater than that subjectively attributed to the 'zero risk factor' scenario and, therefore, that these increases in perceived risk would be reflected in higher risk judgments for each additional risk factor in the scenario. Hence, in addition to observing a single pronounced increase in risk judgments in each of the two age conditions, we also anticipated that we might observe some modest incremental increases in the risk judgments as the number of risk factors increased.
As in Study 1, we considered the possibility that the participants might perceive one of the four risk factors to be significantly more/less risky than the other factors. Hence, we initially conducted a pilot study in which we asked participants (N = 25) to provide risk judgments for the scenario depicting only one of each of the four single risk factors. We found no significant difference between the mean risk judgments for all four individual risk factors (alcohol, smoking, overweight, sedentary), F(3, 24) = 0.008, p = 0.999, η 2 p = 0.001.
Results
As shown in Figure 3 number of risk factors group (e.g., between the zero and one risk factor groups, between the one and two risk factor groups, etc.). We employed Tukey's HSD test due to its power and its capacity to control the overall Type I error rate. (24) The analysis revealed a main effect for the number of risk factors, F(4, 161) = 10.43, p < .0001, η 2 = 0.21, and the post hoc tests (see Table 1 ) found no significant (ps > 0.20) difference between the risk judgments in the zero and one factors groups, the one and two factors group, and the two and three factors groups.
However, a significant (p < 0.05) difference was observed between the judgments in the three (ps > 0.10) differences were found between the risk judgments in the one and two factors group, the two and three factors groups, and the three and the four risk factor groups.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Discussion
As anticipated, the results of this study show that, as the number of risk factors increased, there were modest incremental increases in risk judgments across both vulnerability conditions. However, our analyses also revealed that one marked increase in risk judgments was evident in both the 25 and 65 year olds conditions and that these marked increases were associated with fewer/more risk factors when the potential victims were more/less vulnerable to the adverse outcome. Hence, while the pattern of risk judgments observed in this study demonstrated consistencies with both the Incremental Increase and Pronounced Increase Models, the findings are also consistent with our earlier explanation for the findings from Study 1. That is, both Studies 1 and 3 indicate that individuals' risk judgments may increase markedly (i.e., by a relatively larger magnitude) when the number of risk factors increases by just one factor and, more specifically, that these marked increases appear to be influenced by the potential victim's vulnerability to those factors. However, some caution must be exercised in drawing a firm conclusion that the marked increases are directly attributable to the potential victim's vulnerability. This is because the moderating influence of vulnerability can only be inferred from the existence/absence of significant difference in risk judgments between the risk factor groups in the 25 year old condition relative to the existence/absence of a significant difference in the 65 year old condition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Prior to the above set of studies, there had been a dearth of research concerning the extent to which the number of risk factors in a given context might be utilized by individuals as an independent indicator of risk magnitude. Taken together, the results suggest that, when forming a single isolated risk judgment for situations that feature any number of risk factors, individuals may, to some extent, rely on global impressions of the overall risk. Even when the factors are each regarded as posing a similar magnitude of risk, these global impressions are not necessarily characterized by even incremental increases in judged risk for each additional risk factor. Rather, globalized judgments may be characterized by a pronounced increase that occurs in response to increases in the number of risk factors that are perceived to be 'high' relative to the potential victim's capacity to tolerate those factors. Moreover, our results indicate that this 'one too many' effect may be sufficiently robust to be evident in situations where the risk factors present a fairly immediate threat to the potential victims (Study 1) and in situations where the risk is cumulative and the adverse outcome is more temporally distant (Study 3). By contrast, the results of Study 2 indicate that when individuals are required to form risk judgments for each variation of the number of risk factors in a given situation, they may rely less on a global impression of overall risk and, instead, employ a 'logical' inference that risk increases/decreases in response to relative increases/decreases in the number of risk factors.
It is possible that our findings are consistent with the explanations of how people process and respond to messages as described by Petty and Cacioppo's Elaboration Likelihood Model. (25) Specifically, the Elaboration Likelihood Model suggests that individuals typically process persuasive arguments via one of two routes, known as the central route and the peripheral route. When following the central route, the individual engages in a careful and deliberative assessment of the information presented. When following the peripheral route, the individual makes simple affective or intuitive inferences that negate the need for complex cognitive processing. (26, 27) It is possible that, when our participants formed their judgments in Studies 1 and 3, they avoided the cognitive burden of using the central route to assess and assimilate the influence of several individual risk factors.
Consequently, they may have relied more on the peripheral route to form global impressions of risk in a relatively facile manner. The limited amount of detailed analysis in these judgments may have led the participants to form less precise estimates that are more attuned to distinguishing between lower and higher levels of perceived risk. By contrast, when participants in Study 2 were presented with variations in the number of risk factors, they would have been conscious of the need to ensure that their judgments were logically coherent (e.g., it would have made little sense for a participant to judge the risk of injury as 5 in 100
for the three risk factor scenario if he/she had already judged the risk of injury as 30 in 100
for the one risk factor scenario). Making these more coherent judgments would have involved deliberatively comparing and revising risk estimates relative to any prior estimates.
Consequently, they would most probably have been undertaken using the central route. The notion that our results are consistent with the Elaboration Likelihood Model is further supported by related empirical research by Petty and Cacioppo. In particular, this has shown that, when peripheral processing is engaged, the number of arguments in a message acts as an important cue that can substantially influence perceptions and attitudes. However, when central processing is engaged, each argument is more carefully evaluated and scrutinized and, therefore, has less influence on perceptions and attitudes. cognitions to make separate risk judgments for each factor before he/she arrives at a holistic risk judgment. Importantly, in such cases, the risk communicator would need to make an assessment as to whether this latter approach is preferable in light of the specific objective that the message aims to achieve (e.g., behavioral change) and/or is ethically obliged to fulfill (e.g., to educate).
One further point to consider is that the aim of our research was to develop empirical insights into the effect that variation in the number of risk factors can have upon risk judgments, rather than to assess whether our participant's subjective risk judgments were consistent with some form of normative standard. For example, it was not our intention to determine whether the judgment pattern observed in Study 1 was more consistent with the 'objective' risk than the judgment pattern observed in Study 2 (in any case, there is an absence of empirical data concerning how the three specific risk factors [steep hills, uneven pathway, extra miles] would affect the likelihood of injury in the same context). Nonetheless, in relation to Study 3, it is interesting to note that epidemiological evidence shows that most heart disease risk factors interact synergistically. That is, the risk attributable to a given combination of heart disease risk factors typically exceeds the sum of the risk attributable to those constituent factors when operating alone. (29, 30) Whilst the participants in Study 3 did provide higher/lower risk judgments relative to higher/lower risk factor quantities, these increased/attenuated judgments were relatively modest and did not reflect the synergistic relationships highlighted by the epidemiological evidence. This finding is consistent with other studies, which have found that people often underestimate the risk attributable to factor combinations that, according to empirical evidence, present synergistic risks. (31, 32) Hence, a further important observation can be made from the results of Study 3 concerning an individual making risk judgments for situations that feature multiple risk factors. Specifically, we can infer that individual's judgments may be more likely to increase significantly when the number of risk factors is high relative to the potential victim's vulnerability, rather than when those risk factors are ones that are known to interact synergistically.
Limitations and Future Directions
While the present research provides important insights into the influence of the number of risk factors on subjective risk judgments, it also illuminates other avenues for future research. In particular, we held the frequency of exposure to specific risk factors larger sample sizes may find that it becomes harder to distinguish between incremental and pronounced increases because both types of increase may be statistically significant. To counter this issue, we suggest that researchers could set a p-value for identifying pronounced increases (e.g., p = 0.01) that is relatively lower than the p-value set for identifying incremental increases (e.g., p = 0.05). In these circumstances, any increases that are statistically significant at the higher p level, but which do not meet the criteria set for a statistically significant pronounced increase, could then be classified as incremental increases only. Similarly, researchers could explore the merits of using predetermined effect sizes, such as low vs. medium effect sizes as defined by Cohen 16 , to distinguish between incremental and pronounced increases, respectively, in studies that use larger sample sizes.
CONCLUSION
Our studies provide important new insights into subjective risk judgments. First, we have identified that it cannot be assumed that there will be a positive relationship between the number of risk factors and the magnitude of subjective risk judgments. Second, the evidence suggests that the absence of this positive relationship may result from a reliance on globalized risk judgments that are not based on a deliberative evaluation and assimilation of the risk magnitudes attributable to each risk factor. Third, our studies show that these globalized judgments can be characterized by pronounced increases in perceived risk that are formed with consideration of the potential victim's vulnerability to that risk. Moreover, we suggest that the existence of these pronounced increases in perceived risk may offer a partial explanation as to why individuals are sometimes indifferent or dismissive of some risk issues, yet concerned or alarmed by others. That is, when the number of risk factors elicits a pronounced increase in perceived risk, this may trigger a more precautionary state of mind, yet prior to the pronounced increase the individual may remain confident that the risk is negligible or easily mitigated.
Many risk-related circumstances are characterized by the presence of more than one risk factor and any subjective risk assessment for those circumstances should incorporate the influence of multiple factors. In such circumstances, it may often be the case that individuals are required to make intuitive risk assessments within a restricted time frame, using little or no data, and having a limited cognitive capacity (or even motivation) to fully tackle the task complexity. One means of circumnavigating this task complexity is to rely on globalized impressions of the overall risk. Our studies suggest that, on one hand, such an approach may provide a sophisticated cognitive shortcut for identifying when precautionary action may be needed in response to a precarious combination of multiple risk factors and vulnerability. On the other hand, reliance on this approach could lead to over-or under-estimations of overall risk and, therefore, may not serve as an appropriate guide to related behavioral decisions.
Hence, the results of our studies point towards a need for those who assess and communicate risk to carefully consider how information about multiple risk factors might be (mis)interpreted, with due consideration being given to the worst outcomes that could occur.
Helping individuals to arrive at more balanced assessments of overall risk could be an important part of facilitating a journey towards behavioral responses that are proportionate to the vast array of hazardous situations that are characterized by multiple risk factors.
FOOTNOTES
1. Although it can be argued that age is itself a risk factor, we elected to manipulate age as a means of varying vulnerability. Specifically, because age is not modifiable, we used it in our study as a form of 'background risk' that could be varied in order to influence the degree of vulnerability to the other four modifiable risk factors. Figures highlighted in bold indicate where the difference between the mean risk judgment for a specific scenario (e.g., the zero risk factor scenario) and the mean risk judgment for a scenario featuring exactly one more risk factor (e.g., the one risk factor scenario) was significantly greater. 
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